Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality by Grimmelmann, James
  THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435 
Some Skepticism 
About Search Neutrality 
By James Grimmelmann* 
 
The perfect search engine would be like the mind of God.1 
The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or 
some loathsome insect, over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully 
provoked; his wrath towards you burns like fire; he looks upon you as 
worthy of nothing else, but to be cast into the fire …2 
If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him.3 
Search engines are attention lenses; they bring the online world into focus.  
They can redirect, reveal, magnify, and distort.  They have immense power to 
help and to hide.  We use them, to some extent, always at our own peril.  And 
out of the many ways that search engines can cause harm, the thorniest 
problems of all stem from their ranking decisions.4 
What makes ranking so problematic?  Consider an example.  The U.K. 
technology company Foundem offers “vertical search”5—it helps users 
compare prices for electronics, books, and other goods.  That makes it a Google 
competitor.6  But in June 2006, Google applied a “penalty” to Foundem’s 
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1 Charles Ferguson, What’s Next for Google, TECH. REV., Jan. 1, 2005, at 38, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/web/14065/ (quoting Sergey Brin, co-founder of  
Google). 
2 Jonathan Edwards, Sinners in the Hands of  an Angry God (sermon delivered July 8, 1741 in 
Enfield, Connecticut), available in 22 WORKS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS 411 (Harry S. Stout & 
Nathan O. Hatch eds., Yale University Press 2003). 
3 Voltaire, Epître à l’auteur du livre des Trois imposteurs [Letter to the Author of  The Three 
Impostors] (1768), available at http://www.whitman.edu/VSA/trois.imposteurs.html. 
4 See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of  Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17–44 (2007) 
(identifying nine distinct types of  harm search engines can cause to users, information 
providers, and third parties). 
5 See generally JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE 
RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 274–76 (2005) (discussing “domain-
specific search”). 
6 See Google Product Search Beta, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/prdhp. 
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website, causing all of its pages to drop dramatically in Google’s rankings.7  It 
took more than three years for Google to remove the penalty and restore 
Foundem to the first few pages of results for searches like “compare prices 
shoei xr-1000.”8  Foundem’s traffic, and hence its business, dropped off 
dramatically as a result.  The experience led Foundem’s co-founder, Adam Raff, 
to become an outspoken advocate: creating the site searchneutrality.org,9 filing 
comments with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),10 and taking 
his story to the op-ed pages of The New York Times,11 calling for legal protection 
for the Foundems of the world. 
Of course, the government doesn’t get involved every time a business is harmed 
by a bad ranking—or Consumer Reports would be out of business.12  Instead, 
search-engine critics base their case for regulation on the immense power of 
search engines, which can “break the business of a Web site that is pushed 
down the rankings.”13  They have the power to shape what millions of users, 
carrying out billions of searches a day, see.14  At that scale, search engines are 
the new mass media15—or perhaps the new meta media—capable of shaping 
public discourse itself.  And while power itself may not be an evil, abuse of 
power is. 
Search-engine critics thus aim to keep search engines—although in the U.S. and 
much of the English-speaking world, it might be more accurate to say simply 
“Google”16—from abusing their dominant position.  The hard part comes in 
defining “abuse.”  After a decade of various attempts, critics have hit on the 
                                                     
7 See Foundem’s Google Story, SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.searchneutrality.org/foundem-google-story. 
8 The Shoei XR-1000 is a motorcycle helmet—according to Foundem, it’s £149.99 plus £10 
delivery from Helmet City. 
9 About, SEARCH NEUTRALITY.ORG, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.searchneutrality.org/about. 
10 Reply Comments of  Foundem, In the Matter of  Preserving the Open Internet Broadband 
Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 (F..C.C). 
11 Adam Raff, Search, But You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at A27. 
12 Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (holding Consumer Reports not 
subject to product disparagement liability for negative review of  Bose speaker). 
13 The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at A30. 
14 See GRANT ESKELSEN ET AL, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY FACT BOOK 12–13 (10th ed. 2009), 
http://pff.org/issues-pubs/books/factbook_10th_Ed.pdf. 
15 See generally KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT (2009) 
(trying to understand Google by adopting the perspective of  the media industry).  Cf. Aaron 
Swartz, Googling for Sociopaths, RAW THOUGHT (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/googled (describing Googled as “a history of  [Google] 
as told by the incumbent sociopaths”). 
16 See ESKELSEN ET AL., FACT BOOK, supra note 14. 
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idea of “neutrality” as a governing principle.  The idea is explicitly modeled on 
network neutrality, which would “forbid operators of broadband networks to 
discriminate against third-party applications, content or portals.”17  Like 
broadband Internet service providers (ISPs), search engines “accumulate great 
power over the structure of online life.”18  Thus, perhaps search engines should 
similarly be required not to discriminate among websites. 
For some academics, this idea is a thought experiment: a way to explore the 
implications of network neutrality ideas.19  For others, it is a real proposal: a 
preliminary agenda for action.20  Lawyers for ISPs fighting back against network 
neutrality have seized on it, either as a reductio ad absurdum or a way to kneecap 
their bitter rival Google.21  Even the New York Times has gotten into the game, 
running an editorial calling for scrutiny of Google’s “editorial policy.”22  Since 
New York Times editorials, as a rule, reflect no independent thought but only a 
kind of prevailing conventional wisdom, it is clear that search neutrality has 
truly arrived on the policy scene. 
Notwithstanding its sudden popularity, the case for search neutrality is a 
muddle. There is a fundamental misfit between its avowed policy goal of 
protecting users and most of the tests it proposes to protect them. Scratch 
beneath the surface of search neutrality and you will find that it would protect 
                                                     
17 Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 333 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=812991. 
18 Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carries and Search 
Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL. FORUM 263, 298, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134159 [hereinafter Pasquale, 
Internet Nondiscrimination Principles]. 
19 See Mark R. Patterson, Non-Network Barriers to Network Neutrality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2843 
(2010); Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the Never-ending Conflict 
Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets, 8 REV. NETWORK ECON. 40 (2009). 
20 See DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE 
INTERNET AGE (2009) [hereinafter NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM]; Pasquale, Internet 
Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 18; Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search 
Commission: Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of  Speech, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 
(2008) [hereinafter Bracha & Pasquale, Federal Search Commission]; Jennifer A. Chandler, A 
Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1095 (2007). 
21 Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Senior Vice President, AT&T, to Sharon Gillett, Chief, 
Wireline Competition Bureau Federal Communications Commission (Sept. 25, 2009), 
available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/technology/20090925_ATT-
Letter.pdf. 
22 The Google Algorithm, supra note 13.  But see Danny Sullivan, The New York Times Algorithm & 
Why It Needs Government Regulation, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (July 15, 2010) (parodying New 
York Times editorial on Google). 
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not search users, but websites.  In the search space, however, websites are as 
often users’ enemies as not; the whole point of search is to help users avoid the 
sites they don’t want to see. 
In short, search neutrality’s ends and means don’t match.  To explain why, I will 
deconstruct eight proposed search-neutrality principles: 
1. Equality:  Search engines shouldn’t differentiate at all among websites.   
2. Objectivity: There are correct search results and incorrect ones, so search 
engines should return only the correct ones.   
3. Bias: Search engines should not distort the information landscape.   
4. Traffic: Websites that depend on a flow of visitors shouldn’t be cut off 
by search engines.   
5. Relevance: Search engines should maximize users’ satisfaction with 
search results.   
6. Self-interest: Search engines shouldn’t trade on their own account.   
7. Transparency: Search engines should disclose the algorithms they use to 
rank web pages.   
8. Manipulation: Search engines should rank sites only according to general 
rules, rather than promoting and demoting sites on an individual basis.   
As we shall see, all eight of these principles are unusable as bases for sound 
search regulation. 
I would like to be clear up front about the limits of my argument. Just because 
search neutrality is incoherent, it doesn’t follow that search engines deserve a 
free pass under antitrust, intellectual property, privacy, or other well-established 
bodies of law.23  Nor is search-specific legal oversight out of the question.  
Search engines are capable of doing dastardly things: According to 
BusinessWeek, the Chinese search engine Baidu explicitly shakes down 
websites, demoting them in its rankings unless they buy ads.24  It’s easy to tell 
horror stories about what search engines might do that are just plausible enough 
to be genuinely scary.25  My argument is just that search neutrality, as currently 
proposed, is unlikely to be workable and quite likely to make things worse.  It 
fails at its own goals, on its own definition of the problem.   
                                                     
23 This essay is not the place for a full discussion of  these issues (although we will meet 
antitrust and consumer protection law in passing).  Grimmelmann, The Structure of  Search 
Engine Law, supra note 4, provides a more detailed map.   
24 Chi-Chu Tschang, The Squeeze at China’s Baidu, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_02/b4115021710265.htm 
(alleging that Baidu directly retaliates against sites that refuse to buy sponsored links by 
demoting them in its organic rankings). 
25 See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Scroogled, http://craphound.com/scroogled.html; Tom Slee, Mr. 
Google’s Guidebook, WHIMSLEY (Mar. 7, 2008), 
http://whimsley.typepad.com/whimsley/2008/03/mr-googles-guid.html. 
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Theory 
Before delving into the specifics of search-neutrality proposals, it will help to 
understand the principles said to justify them.  There are two broad types of 
arguments made to support search neutrality, one each focusing on users and 
on websites.  A search engine that misuses its ranking power might be seen 
either as misleading users about what’s available online, or as blocking websites 
from reaching users.26  Consider the arguments in turn. 
Users:  Search helps people find the things they want and need.  Good search 
results are better for them.  And since search is both subjective and personal, 
users themselves are the ones who should define what makes search results 
good.  The usual term for this goal is “relevance”: relevant results are the ones 
that users themselves are most satisfied with.27  All else being equal, good search 
policy should try to maximize relevance. 
A libertarian might say that this goal is trivial.28  Users are free to pick and 
choose among search engines and other informational tools.29  They will 
naturally flock to the search engine that offers them the most relevant results; 
the market will provide just as much relevance as it is efficient to provide.30  
There is no need for regulation; relevance, being demanded by users, will be 
                                                     
26 Other arguments for search neutrality reduce to these two.  Bracha and Pasquale, for 
example, are concerned about democracy.  They want “an open and relatively equal chance 
to all members of  society for participation in the cultural sphere.” Bracha & Pasquale, Federal 
Search Commission, supra note 20, at 1183–84.  Search engines provide that chance if  
individuals can both find (as users) and be found (as websites) when they participate in 
politics and culture.  Similarly, Bracha and Pasquale’s economic efficiency argument turns on 
users’ ability to find market information, id. at 1173–75. and their fairness concern speaks to 
websites’ losses of  “audience or business,” id. at 1175–76.  Whatever interest society has in 
search neutrality arises from users’ and websites’ interests in it—so we are justified in 
focusing our attention on users and websites. 
27 See BATTELLE, THE SEARCH, supra note 5, at 19–25. 
28 For a clear statement of  a libertarian perspective on search neutrality, see Mike Masnick’s 
posts at Techdirt on the subject, collected at 
http:/www.techdirt.com/blog.php?tag=search+neutrality.  Eric Goldman’s Search 
Engine Bias and the Demise of  Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 188 (2006), makes a 
general case against the regulation of  relevance on similar grounds. 
29 In Google’s words, “Competition is just one click away.”  Adam Kovacevich, Google’s 
Approach to Competition, GOOGLE POLICY BLOG (May 8, 2009), 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/05/googles-approach-to-
competition.html. 
30 See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of  Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151. 
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supplied by search engines.  And this is exactly what search engines themselves 
say: relevance is their principal, or only, goal.31 
The response to this point of view—most carefully argued by Frank 
Pasquale32—is best described as “liberal.”  It focuses on maximizing the 
effective autonomy of search users, but questions whether market forces 
actually enable users to demand optimal relevance.  For one thing, it questions 
whether users can actually detect deviations from relevance.33  The user who 
turns to a search engine, by definition, doesn’t yet know what she’s looking for 
or where it is.  Her own knowledge, therefore, doesn’t provide a fully reliable 
check on what the search engine shows her.  The information she would need 
to know that the search engine is hiding something from her may be precisely 
the information it’s hiding from her—a relevant site that she didn’t know 
existed.34   
Perhaps just as importantly, structural features of the search market can make it 
hard for users to discipline search engines by switching.  Search-neutrality 
advocates have argued that search exhibits substantial barriers to entry.35  The 
web is so big, and search algorithms so complex and refined, that there are 
substantial fixed costs to competing at all.36  Moreover, the rise of personalized 
search both creates switching costs for individual users37 and also makes it 
harder for them to share information about their experiences with multiple 
search engines.38 
Websites:  The case for protecting websites reaches back into free speech theory.  
Jerome Barron’s 1967 article,  Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right,39 
                                                     
31 See, e.g., Technology Overview, GOOGLE, www.google.com/corporate/tech.html; How Web 
Documents Are Ranked, YAHOO!, 
http://help.yahoo.com/l/us/yahoo/search/indexing/ranking-01.html; Ask Search 
Technology, ASK, http://sp.ask.com/en/docs/about/ask_technology.shtml. 
32 See Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 18; Bracha & Pasquale, Federal 
Search Commission, supra note 20; Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of  Reply on 
Search Results, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 61 (2008); Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and 
Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115 (2006). 
33 See Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20, at 1116; Patterson, Non-Network 
Barriers, supra note 19, at 2860-62. 
34 See Bracha & Pasquale, Federal Search Commission, supra note 20, at 1183–84. 
35 See id. at 1181–82. 
36 See id. at 1181. 
37 See Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 18, at 265. 
38 See Frank Pasquale, Could Personalized Search Ruin Your Life?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 7, 
2008), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/02/personalized_se.html. 
39 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). 
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argued that freedom of speech is an empty right in a mass-media society unless 
one also has access to the mass media themselves.  He thus argued that 
newspapers should be required to open their letters to the editor and their 
advertising to all points of view.40  Although his proposed right of access is 
basically a dead letter as far as First Amendment doctrine goes,41 it captured the 
imaginations of media-law scholars and media advocates.42 
Scholars have begun to adapt Barron’s ideas to online intermediaries, including 
search engines.  Dawn Nunziato’s book Virtual Freedom draws extensively on 
Barron to argue that Congress may need to “authorize the regulation of 
dominant search engines to require that they provide meaningful access to 
content.”43  Jennifer Chandler applies Barron’s ideas to propose a “right to 
reach an audience”44 that would give website owners various protections against 
exclusion45 and demotion by search engines.46  Similarly, Frank Pasquale 
suggests bringing “universal service” over into the search space,47 perhaps 
through a government-provided search engine.48 
The Barronian argument for access, however, needs to be qualified.  The free-
speech interest in access to search engine ranking placement is really audiences’ 
free speech interest; the real harm is that search users have been deprived of 
access to the speech of websites, not that websites have been deprived of access 
to users.  Put another way, websites’ access interest is derivative of users’ 
interests.  In the Supreme Court’s words, “The First Amendment protects the 
right of every citizen to ‘reach the minds of willing listeners.’”49  Or, in Jerome 
                                                     
40 Id. at 1667. 
41 See Miami Herald Pub’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down Florida law 
requiring newspapers to provide equal space for political responses). 
42 See, e.g., Reclaiming the First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of  Media Reform, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 917–1582 (symposium issue collecting papers from conference honoring the 40th 
anniversary of  publication of  Access to the Press). 
43 NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, at 150. 
44 Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20, at 1103–17 (search engines), 1124-30 
(proposed right). 
45 Exclusion from a search index may sound like a bright-line category of  abuse, but note that 
a demotion from, say, #1 to #58,610 will have the same effect.  No one ever clicks through 
5861 pages of  results.  Thus, in practice, any rule against exclusion would also need to come 
with a—more problematic—rule against substantial demotions.   
46 Id. at 1117–18. 
47 Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 18, at 289–92.  His example, which 
focuses on Google’s scans of  books for its Book Search project, is interesting, but is 
“universal access” only in a loose, metaphorical sense. 
48 See Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural and Political Facility, infra 258. 
49 Hefron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (quoting 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)) (emphasis added). 
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Barron’s, “[T]he point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers but 
the minds of the hearers.”50  With these purposes in mind, let us turn to actual 
search-neutrality proposals. 
Equality 
Scott Cleland observes that Google’s “algorithm reportedly has over 1,000 
variables/discrimination biases which decide which content gets surfaced.”51  
He concludes that “Google is not neutral” and thus should be subject to any 
FCC network-neutrality regulation.52  On this view, a search engine does 
something wrong if it treats websites differently, “surfac[ing]” some, rather than 
others.  This is a theory of neutrality as equality, it comes from the network-
neutrality debates, and it is nonsensical as applied to search. 
Equality has a long pedigree in telecommunications.  For years, common-carrier 
regulations required the AT&T system to offer its services on equal terms to 
anyone who wanted a phone.53  This kind of equality is at the heart of proposed 
network neutrality regulations:  treating all packets identically once they arrive at 
an ISP’s router, regardless of source or contents.54  Whether or not equality in 
packet routing is a good idea as a technical matter, the rule itself is simple 
enough and relatively clear.  One can, without difficulty, identify Comcast’s 
forging of packets to terminate BitTorrent connections as a violation of the 
principle.55  As long as an ISP isn’t overloaded to the point of losing too many 
packets, equality does what it’s supposed to: ensures that every website enjoys 
access to the ISP’s network and customers. 
Try to apply this form of equality to search and the results are absurd.  Of 
course Google differentiates among sites—that’s why we use it.  Systematically 
favoring certain types of content over others isn’t a defect for a search engine—
it’s the point.56  If I search for “Machu Picchu pictures,” I want to see llamas in a 
                                                     
50 Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 39, at 1653. 
51 Scott Cleland, Why Google Is Not Neutral, PRECURSOR BLOG (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://precursorblog.com/content/why-google-is-not-neutral. 
52 Id. 
53 See generally JONATHAN E. NEUCHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS 45–68 
(2005). 
54 For an accessible introduction to the technical issues, see Edward W. Felten, The Nuts and 
Bolts of  Network Neutrality (2006), http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf. 
55 See In re Formal Compl. of  Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading 
Peer-to-Peer Applications, WC Docket No. 07-52, Order, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13,028, 13,029–32 
(discussing blocking), 13,050–58 (finding that blocking violated federal policy) (2008), vacated, 
Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
56 See Karl Bode, Google Might Stop Violating “Search Neutrality”If  Anybody Knew What That 
Actually Meant, TECHDIRT (May 7, 2010), 
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ruined city on a cloud-forest mountaintop, not horny housewives who whiten 
your teeth while you wait for them to refinance your mortgage.  Search 
inevitably requires some form of editorial control.57  A search engine cannot 
possibly treat all websites equally, not without turning into the phone book.  But 
for that matter, even the phone book is not neutral in the sense of giving fully 
equal access to all comers, as the proliferation of AAA Locksmiths and Aabco 
Plumbers attests.  Differentiating among websites, without something more, is 
not wrongful.  
Objectivity 
If search engines must make distinctions, perhaps we should insist that they 
make correct distinctions. Foundem, for example, argues that the Google 
penalty was unfair by pointing to positive write-ups of Foundem from “the 
UK’s leading technology television programme” and “the UK’s leading 
consumer body,” and to its high search ranks on Yahoo! and Bing.58  The 
unvoiced assumption here is that search queries can have objectively right and 
wrong answers.  A search on “James Grimmelmann blog” should come back 
with my weblog at http://laboratorium.net; anything else is a wrong answer. 
But this view of what search is and does is wrong.  A search for “apple” could 
be looking for information about Fiji apples, Apple computers, or Fiona Apple.  
“bbs” could refer to airgun pellets, bulletin-board systems, or bed-and-
breakfasts.  Different people will have different intentions in mind; even the 
same person will have different intentions at different times.  Sergey Brin’s 
theological comparison of perfect search to the “mind of God”59 shows us why 
perfect search is impossible.  Not even Google is—or ever could be—
omniscient.  The search query itself is necessarily an incomplete basis on which 
to guess at possible results.60   
The objective view of search, then, fails for two related reasons.  First, search 
users are profoundly diverse.  They have highly personal, highly contextual 
goals.  One size cannot fit all.  And second, a search engine’s job always 
involves guesswork.61  Some guesses are better than others, but the search 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100504/1324279300.shtml (“[T]he entire purpose 
of  search is to discriminate and point the user toward more pertinent results.”). 
57 See Goldman, Search Engine Bias, supra note 28, at 115–18. 
58 Foundem’s Google Story, supra note 7. 
59  Supra note 1.  
60 See generally ALEX HALAVAIS, THE SEARCH-ENGINE SOCIETY 32–55 (2009) (discussing 
difficulties of  ascertaining meaning in search process). 
61 See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J.  507, 521–28 
(2005). 
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engine will always have to guess.  “James Grimmelmann blog” shouldn’t take 
users to Toyota’s corporate page—but perhaps they were interested in my 
guest-blogging at Concurring Opinions, or in blogs about me, or they have me 
mixed up with Eric Goldman and were actually looking for his blog.  Time 
Warner Cable’s complaint that “significant components of [Google’s] Ad Rank 
scheme are subjective”62 is beside the point.  Search itself is subjective.63 
Few scholars go so far as to advocate explicit re-ranking to correct search 
results.64  But even those who acknowledge that search is subjective sometimes 
write as though it were not. Frank Pasquale gives a hypothetical in which 
“YouTube’s results always appear as the first thirty [Google] results in response 
to certain video queries for which [a rival video site] has demonstrably more 
relevant content.”65  One might ask, “demonstrably more relevant” by what 
standard?  Often the answer will be contentious.  
In Foundem’s case, what difference should it make that Yahoo! and others liked 
Foundem?  So?  That’s their opinion.  Google had a different one.  Who is to 
say that Yahoo! was right and Google was wrong?66  One could equally well 
argue that Google’s low ranking was correct and Yahoo!’s high ranking was the 
mistake.  “compare prices shoei xr-1000” is not the sort of question that admits 
                                                     
62 Comments of  Time Warner Cable Inc. 77, In the Matter of  Preserving the Open Internet 
Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 (F.C.C. comments filed Jan. 14, 
2010). 
63 See Goldman, Search Engine Bias, supra note 28, at 112–13.  This point should not be 
confused with a considered opinion on the question of  how the First Amendment applies to 
search-ranking decisions.  Search engines make editorial judgments about relevance, but they 
also present information that can only be described as factual (such as maps and addresses), 
extol their objectivity in marketing statements, and are perceived by users as having an aura 
of  reliability.   It is possible to make false statements even when speaking subjectively—for 
example, I would be lying to you if  I said that I enjoy eating scallops.  The fact that search 
engines’ judgments are expressed algorithmically, including in ways not contemplated by 
their programmers, complicates the analysis even further.  The definitive First Amendment 
analysis of  search-engine speech has yet to be written.  Academic contributions to that 
conversation include Goldman, Search Engine Bias, supra note 28, at 112–15; Bracha & 
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission, supra note 20, at 1188–1201; Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited, 
supra note 32, at 68–85; NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, passim (and 
particularly pages 149–51); Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20, at 1124–29; 
James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, 53 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 939, 946 (2009); 
Grimmelmann, The Structure of  Search Engine Law, supra note 4, at 58–60.  Some leading cases 
are listed in note 85, infra.  
64 But see Sandeep Pandey et al., Shuffling a Stacked Deck: The Case for Partially Randomized Search 
Results, PROC. 31ST VERY LARGE DATABASES CONF. 781 (2005) (arguing for randomization in 
search results to promote obscure websites).  
65 Pasquale, Internet Nondiscriminaion Principles, supra note 18, at 296. 
66 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of  “False” Is, Falsity and Misleadingness in 
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 101 (2008) (arguing that judgments about 
falsity frequently embody contested social policies). 
  THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 445 
of a right answer.  This is why it doesn’t help to say that the Foundem vote is 
four-to-one against Google.  If deviation from the majority opinion makes a 
search engine wrong, then so much for search engine innovation—and so much 
for unpopular views.67 
Bias 
Ironically, it is the goal of protecting unpopular views that drives the concern 
with search engine “bias.”  Lucas Introna and Helen Nissenbaum, for example, 
are concerned that search engines will direct users to sites that are already 
popular and away from obscure sites.68  Alex Halavais calls for “resistance to 
the homogenizing process of major search engines,”69 including governmental 
interventions.70  These are structural concerns with popularity-based search.  
Others worry about more particular biases.  AT&T complains that “Google’s 
algorithms unquestionably do favor some companies or sites.”71  Scott Cleland 
objects that Google demotes content from other countries in its country-
specific search pages.72 
The point that a technological system can display bias is one of those profound 
observations that is at once both startling and obvious.73  It naturally leads to 
the question of whether, when, and how one could correct for the bias search 
engines introduce.74  But to pull that off, one must have a working 
understanding of what constitutes search-engine bias.  Batya Friedman and 
Helen Nissenbaum define a computer system to be “biased” if it “systematically 
and unfairly discriminates against certain individuals or groups of individuals in 
favor of others.”75  Since search engines systematically discriminate by design, 
                                                     
67 This last point should be especially troubling to Barron-inspired advocates of  “access,” since 
the point of  such a regime is to promote opinions that are not widely shared. 
68 Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of  Search Engines 
Matters, 16 INFO. SOC. 169, 175 (2000). 
69 HALAVAIS, SEARCH ENGINE SOCIETY, supra note 60, at 106. 
70 Id. at 132–38. 
71 Comments of  AT&T Inc. 102, In the Matter of  Preserving the Open Internet Broadband 
Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 (F.C.C. comments filed Jan. 14, 2010). 
72 Cleland, Why Google Is Not Neutral, supra note 51.  
73 In Landgon Winner’s phrase, “artifacts have politics.”  LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE 
AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY19 (University 
of  Chicago Press 1986). 
74 See, e.g., Pandey et al, Shuffling a Stacked Deck, supra note 64. 
75 Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 ACM TRANS. ON 
COMPUTER SYS. 330, 332 (1996).   See also Alejandro M. Diaz, Through the Google Goggles: 
Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design (May 23, 2005) (unpublished B.A. thesis, 
Stanford University), available at  
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all of the heavy lifting in the definition is done by the word “unfair.”  But this 
just kicks the problem down the road.  One still must explain when 
discrimination is “unfair” and when it is not.  Friedman and Nissenbaum’s 
discussion is enlightening, but does not by itself help us identify which practices 
are abusive.76   
The point that socio-technical systems have embedded biases also cuts against 
search neutrality.  We should not assume that if only the search engine could be 
made properly neutral, the search results would be free of bias.  Every search 
result requires both a user to contribute a search query, and websites to 
contribute the content to be ranked.  Neither users nor websites are passive 
participants; both can be wildly, profoundly biased. 
On the website side, the web is anything but neutral.77  Websites compete 
fiercely, and not always ethically, for readers.78  It doesn’t matter what the search 
engine algorithm is; websites will try to game it.  Search-engine optimization, or 
SEO, is as much a fixture of the Internet as spam.  Link farms,79 spam blog 
comments, hacked websites—you name it, and they’ll try it, all in the name of 
improving their search rankings.  A fully invisible search engine, one that 
introduced no new values or biases of its own,  would merely replicate the 
underlying biases of the web itself:80 heavily commercial, and subject to a truly 
mindboggling quantity of spam.  Raff says that search algorithms should be 
“comprehensive.”81  But should users be subjected to a comprehensive 
presentation of discount Canadian pharmaceutical sites?  
On the user side, sometimes the bias is between the keyboard and the chair.  
Fully de-biasing search results would also require de-biasing search queries—
and users’ ability to pick which results they click on.  Take a search for “jew,” 
for example.  Google has been criticized both for returning anti-Semitic sites (to 
                                                     
76 If  one fears, with Bracha and Pasquale, that “a handful of  powerful gatekeepers”   wield 
disproportionate influence, then the solution is simple: break up the bastards.  If  they 
reassemble or reacquire too much power, do it again.  Neutrality will always be an imperfect 
half-measure if  power itself  is the problem. 
77 See Clay Shirky, Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality, SHIRKY.COM (Feb. 8, 2003), 
http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html (discussing vast 
disproportion of  prominence between famous and obscure weblogs). 
78 See IAN H. WITTEN ET AL., WEB DRAGONS: INSIDE THE MYTHS OF SEARCH TECHNOLOGY 
145–75 (Morgan Kaufmann Publishers 2007). 
79 A link farm is a group of  automatically generated web sites that heavily link to each other.  
The point is to trick a popularity-based search engine into believing that all of  the sites in the 
group are popular.  See Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, supra note 63, at 946, 
80 See Patterson, Non-Network Barriers, supra note 19, at 2854–55. 
81 Raff, Search, But You May Not Find, supra note 11. 
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American users) and for not returning such sites (to German users).82  The 
inescapable issue is that Google has users who want to read anti-Semitic web 
pages and users who don’t.  One might call some of those users “biased,” but if 
they are, it’s not Google’s fault.   
Some bias is going to leak through as long as search engines help users find 
what they want.  And helping users find what they want is such a profound 
social good that one should be skeptical of trying to inhibit it.83 Telling users 
what they should see is a serious intrusion on personal autonomy, and thus 
deeply inconsistent with the liberal argument for search neutrality.  If you want 
Google to steer users to websites with views that differ from their own,84 your 
goal is not properly described as search neutrality.  In effect, you have gone back 
to asserting the objective correctness of search results: Certain sites are good for 
users, like whole grains.  
Traffic 
The most common trope in the search debates is the website whose traffic 
vanishes overnight when it disappears from Google’s search results.85  Because 
so much traffic flows through Google, it holds websites over the flames of 
website hell, ready at any instant to let them fall in the rankings.  Chandler’s 
proposed right to reach an audience and Foundem’s proposed “effective, 
accessible, and transparent appeal process”86 attempt to protect websites from 
                                                     
82 See Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, supra note 63, at 943–45. 
83 See James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 48 (2007). 
84 See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (Princeton University Press 2007). 
85 See, e.g., BATTELLE, THE SEARCH, supra note 5, at 153–59 (2bigfeet.com, main index); 
NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, at  14–17 (various sites, AdWords and Google 
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86 Foundem’s Google Story, supra note 7. 
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being dropped.  Dawn Nunzatio, for her part, would require search engines to 
open their sponsored links to political candidates.87 
A right to continued customer traffic would be a legal anomaly; offline 
businesses enjoy no such right.  Some Manhattanites who take the free IKEA 
ferry to its store in Brooklyn eat at the nearby food trucks in the Red Hook Ball 
Fields.88  The food truck owners would have no right to complain if IKEA 
discontinued the ferry or moved its store.  Search neutrality advocates, however, 
would say that RedHookFoodTruck.com has a Jerome Barron-style free-speech 
interest in having access to the search engine’s result pages, and thus has more 
right to complain if the Google ferry no longer comes to its neighborhood.89 
But, as we saw above, this is really an argument that users have a relevance interest 
in seeing the site.  If no one actually wants to visit RedHookFoodTruck.com, 
then its owner shouldn’t be heard to complain about her poor search ranking.  
When push comes to shove, search neutrality advocates recognize that websites 
must plead their case in terms of users’ needs.  Chandler’s modern right of 
access is a “right to reach a willing audience,”90 which she describes as “the right 
to be free of the imposition of discriminatory filters that the listener would not 
otherwise have used.”91  Even Foundem’s Adam Raff presents his actual search-
neutrality principle in user-protective terms: “search engines should have no 
editorial policies other than that their results be comprehensive, impartial and 
based solely on relevance.”92  Relevance is, of course, the touchstone of users’ 
interests, not websites’. 
Indeed, looking at the rankings from a website’s perspective, rather than from 
users’, can be counterproductive to free-speech values.  If users really find other 
websites more relevant, then making them visit RedHookFoodTruck.com 
impinges on their autonomy and on their free speech interests as listeners.  For 
any given search query, there may be dozens, hundreds, thousands of 
competing websites.  The vast majority of them will thus have interests that 
diverge from users’—and every incentive to override users’ wishes. 
                                                     
87 NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, at 150–51. 
88 See Adam Kuban, Red Hook Vendors: A Quick Guide for the Uninitiated, SERIOUS EATS (July 18, 
2008), http://newyork.seriouseats.com/2008/07/red-hook-vendors-soccer-tacos-
guide-how-to-get-there-what-to-eat.html. 
89 See Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20; NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM, supra 
note 20. 
90 Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20, at 1099 (emphasis added). 
91 Id. at 1103 (emphasis added). 
92 Raff, Search, But You May Not Find, supra note 11 (emphasis added). 
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Even when users are genuinely indifferent among various websites, some search 
neutrality advocates think websites should be protected from “arbitrary” or 
“unaccountable” ranking changes as a matter of fairness.93  We should call the 
websites that currently sit at the top of search engine rankings by their proper 
name—incumbents—and we should look as skeptically on their demands to 
remain in power as we would on any other incumbent’s.  The search engine that 
ranks a site highly has conferred a benefit on it; turning that gratuitous benefit 
into a permanent entitlement gets the ethics of the situation exactly backwards. 
Indeed, giving highly-ranked websites what is in effect a property right in search 
rankings runs counter to everything we know about how to hand out property 
rights.  Websites don’t create the rankings; search engines do.  Similarly, search 
engines are in a better position to manage rankings and prevent waste.  And if 
each individual search ranking came with a right to placement, every search-
results page would be an anti-commons in the making.94 
Thus, it is irrelevant that Foundem had a prominent search placement on Google 
before it landed in the doghouse.  Just as the subjectivity of search means that 
search engines will frequently disagree with each other, it also means that a 
search engine will disagree with itself over time.  From the outside looking in, 
we have no basis to say whether the initial high ranking or the subsequent low 
ranking made more sense.  To give Foundem—and every other website 
currently enjoying a good search ranking—the right to continue where it is 
would lock in search results for all time, obliterating search-engine 
experimentation and improvement.  
Relevance 
Given the importance of user autonomy to search-neutrality theory, relevance is 
a natural choice for a neutrality principle.  In Foundem’s words, search results 
should be “based solely on relevance.”95  Chandler proposes a rule against 
“discrimination that listeners would not have chosen.”96  Bracha and Pasquale 
decry “search engines [that] highlight or suppress critical information” and 
thereby “shape and constrain [users’] choices”—that is, hide information that 
users would have found relevant.97 
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Relevance, however, is such an obvious good that its virtue verges on the 
tautological.  Search engines compete to give users relevant results; they exist at all 
only because they do.  Telling a search engine to be more relevant is like telling 
a boxer to punch harder.  Of course, sometimes boxers do throw fights, so it 
isn’t out of the question that a search engine might underplay its hand.  How, 
though, could regulators tell?  Regulators can’t declare a result “relevant” 
without expressing a view as to why other possibilities are “irrelevant,” and that 
is almost always going to be contested. 
Here’s an example: Foundem.  Recall that Foundem is a “vertical search site” 
that specializes in consumer goods.  Well, a great many vertical search sites are 
worthless.  (If you don’t believe me, please try using a few for a bit.)  Like other 
kinds of sites that simply roll up existing content and slap some of their own 
ads on it—Wikipedia clones and local business directories also come to mind—
they superficially resemble legitimate sites that provide something of value to 
users.98  But only superficially.  The “penalties” that reduce vertical search sites’ 
Google ranks aren’t an attempt to reduce competition at the expense of 
relevance; they’re an attempt to implement relevance.99  There are a few relatively 
good, usable product-search sites, but most of them are junk and good riddance 
to them.  You’re welcome to disagree—search is subjective—but I’d rather have 
the anti-vertical penalty in place than not.  Those who would argue that 
Google’s rankings don’t reflect relevance have a heavy burden of proof, in the 
face of ample, easily verified evidence to the contrary. 
In fact, behind almost every well-known story of search engine caprice, there is 
a more persuasive relevance-enhancing counter-story.  For example, 
SourceTool, another vertical search engine, has sued Google under antitrust law 
for, in effect, demoting it in Google’s rankings for search ads.100  SourceTool, 
though, is a “directory” with a taxonomic logic of dubious utility—the United 
Nations Standard Products and Services Code—and almost no content of its 
own.  It’s the rare user indeed who will find SourceTool relevant.  If you care 
about relevance and user autonomy, you should applaud Google’s decision to 
demote SourceTool. 
                                                     
98 See Chris Lake, Foundem vs Google: A Case Study in SEO Fail, ECONSULTANCY (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://econsultancy.com/blog/4456-foundem-vs-google-a-case-study-in-seo-fail; 
Little or No Original Content, GOOGLE WEBMASTER CENTRAL (updated June 10, 2009), 
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19, 2009), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/11/19/google_hand_of_god/. 
100 See TradeComet.com LLC v. Google Inc., No. 09–CIV-1400 (S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Feb. 
17, 2009).  The District Court dismissed the case on the basis of  the forum-selection clause 
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Self-Interest 
In practice, even as search-neutrality advocates claim “relevance” as their goal, 
they rely on proxies for it.  The most common is self-interest.  A Consumer 
Watchdog report accuses Google of “an abandonment of [its] pledge to provide 
neutral search capability” by “steering Internet searchers to its own services” to 
“muscle its way into new markets.”101  Foundem alleges that Google demotes it 
and other vertical search sites to fend off competition, and alleges that Google’s 
links to itself give it “an unassailable competitive advantage.”102  Bracha and 
Pasquale worry that search engines can change their rankings “in response to 
positive or negative inducements from other parties.”103 
Bad motive may lead to bad relevance, but it’s also a bad proxy for it.  The first 
problem is evidentiary.  By definition, motivations are interior, personal.104  Of 
course, the law has to guess at motives all the time, but the task is by its nature 
harder than looking to extrinsic evidence.   People get it wrong all the time.  In 
2009, an Amazon employee with a fat finger hit a wrong button and categorized 
tens of thousands of gay-themed books as “adult.”105  An angry mob of 
Netizens assumed the company had deliberately pulled the books from its 
search engine out of anti-gay animus, and used the Twitter hashtag #amazonfail 
to express their very public outrage.106  Amazon’s reclassification was a mistake 
(a quickly corrected one), and a vivid demonstration of the power of search 
algorithms—but not a case of bad motives.107 
In all but the most blatant of cases, in fact, a search engine will be able to tell a 
plausible relevance story about its ranking decisions.Proving that a relevance 
story is pretextual will be extraordinarily difficult, in view of the complexity and 
subjectivity of search.  But it would also be disastrous to adopt the opposite 
point of view and presume pretext.  The absence of bad motive is a negative 
that it will often be impossible for the search engine to prove.  How can it 
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http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/TrafficStudy-Google.pdf. 
102 Reply Comments of  Foundem, supra note 10, at 1. 
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establish, for example, that the engineer who added the anti-vertical penalty 
didn’t have a lunchroom conversation with an executive who played up the 
competition angle?  This is not to say that serious cases of abuse are 
implausible,108 just that investigation will be unusually hard and that false 
positives will be dangerously frequent. 
There is a nontrivial antitrust issue lurking here.  In the United States, Google 
has a dominant market share in both search and search advertising, and one 
could argue that Google has started to leverage its position in anticompetitive 
ways.109  Antitrust, however approaches such questions with a well-developed 
analytical toolkit: relevant markets, market power, pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects, and so on.110  Antitrust rightly focuses on the effects of 
business practices on consumers; search neutrality should not short-circuit that 
consumer-centric analysis by overemphasizing the role of a search engine’s 
motives.  Some things can be good for Google and good for its users.   
Thus, when Google links to its own products, not only can there be substantial 
technical benefits from integration, but often Google is helping users by 
pointing them to services that really are better than the competition.  Consumer 
Watchdog, for example, cries foul that Google “put its own [map] service atop 
all others for generic address searches,”111 and that Google Maps has taken half 
of the local search market at the expense of previously dominant MapQuest and 
Yahoo! Maps.112  But perhaps MapQuest and Yahoo! Maps deserved to lose.  
Google Maps was groundbreaking when launched, and years later, it remains 
one of the best-implemented services on the Internet, with astonishingly clever 
scripting, flexible route-finding, and a powerful application programming 
interface (API).113 
                                                     
108 Baidu’s alleged shakedown (see supra note 24 and accompanying text), if  true, would be an 
example.  Willingness to buy Baidu search ads is not in itself  a reliable indicator of  relevance 
to Baidu searchers.  But then again, even pay-for-placement was once considered a plausible 
model for main-column search results—and willingness to pay is not inherently a crazy 
proxy for relevance.  See BATTELLE, THE SEARCH, supra note 5, at 104–14 (discussing GoTo’s 
pay-for-placement model).  See also Goldman, Coasean Analysis, supra note 30 (envisioning a 
future in which advertisers and users negotiate over access to users’ attention).  Indeed, 
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column search results, sometimes more so.  It might be better to say that Baidu’s real 
problems are monopoly pricing and (compulsory) stealth marketing. 
109 See, e.g., Brad Stone, Sure, It’s Big, But Is That Bad?, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2010, at BU1. 
110 See generally Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of  Antitrust: The 
Case Against the Antitrust Case Against Google, HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. (forthcoming). 
111 TRAFFIC REPORT, supra note 101, at 5. 
112 Id. at 5–7. 
113 See, e.g., John Carroll, Google Maps and Innovation, A DEVELOPER’S VIEW (Oct. 12, 2005), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/carroll/google-maps-and-innovation/1499. 
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One form of self-interest that may be well-enough defined to justify regulatory 
scrutiny is the straightforward bribe: a payment from a website to change its 
ranking, or a competitor’s.  Search-engine critics argue that search engines 
should disclose commercial relationships that bear on their ranking decisions.114  
This is a standard, sensible policy response to the fear of stealth marketing.115  
Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has specifically warned search 
engines not to mix their organic and paid search results.116  More generally, the 
FTC endorsement guidelines provide that endorsements must “reflect the 
honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser”117 and that any 
connections between endorser and seller that “might materially affect the weight 
or credibility of the endorsement”118 must be fully disclosed.  These policies 
have a natural application to search engines.  A search engine that factors 
payments from sponsors into its ranking decisions is lying to its users unless it 
discloses those relationships, and this sort of lie would trigger the FTC’s 
jurisdiction.119  This isn’t a neutrality principle, or even unique to search; it’s just 
a natural application of a well-established legal norm. 
Transparency 
Search-engine critics generally go further and argue that search engines should 
also be required to disclose their algorithms in detail: 
x Introna and Nissenbaum: “As a first step we would demand full and 
truthful disclosure of the underlying rules (or algorithms) governing 
indexing, searching, and prioritizing, stated in a way that is meaningful 
to the majority of web users.”120   
x Foundem: “Search Neutrality can be defined as the principle that 
search engines should be open and transparent about their editorial 
policies … .”121   
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x Pasquale: “[Dominant search engines] should submit to regulation that 
bans stealth marketing and reliably verifies the absence of the practice.”122  
These disclosures are meant to inform users about what they’re getting from a 
search engine (Introna and Nissenbaum), to inform websites about the 
standards they’re being judged by (Foundem),123 or to inform regulators about 
what the search engine is actually doing (Pasquale).124 
Algorithmic transparency is a delicate business.  Full disclosure of the algorithm 
itself runs up against critical interests of the search engine.  A fully public 
algorithm is one that the search engine’s competitors can copy wholesale.125  
Worse, it is one that websites can use to create highly optimized search-engine 
spam.126  Writing in 2000, long before the full extent of search-engine spam was 
as clear as it is today, Introna and Nissenbaum thought that the “impact of 
these unethical practices would be severely dampened if both seekers and those 
wishing to be found were aware of the particular biases inherent in any given 
search engine.”127  That underestimates the scale of the problem.  Imagine 
instead your inbox without a spam filter.  You would doubtless be “aware of the 
particular biases” of the people trying to sell you fancy watches and penis 
pills—but that will do you little good if your inbox contains a thousand pieces 
of spam for every email you want to read.  That is what will happen to search 
results if search algorithms are fully public; the spammers will win. 
For this reason, search-neutrality advocates now acknowledge the danger of 
SEO and thus propose only limited transparency.128  Pasquale suggests, for 
example, that Google could respond to a question about its rankings with a list 
of a few factors that principally affected a particular result.129  But search is 
immensely complicated—so complicated that it may not be possible to boil a 
ranking down to a simple explanation.  When the law demands disclosure of 
complex matters in simple terms, we get pro forma statements and boilerplate.  
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Consumer credit disclosures and securities prospectuses have brought 
important information into the open, but they haven’t done much to aid the 
understanding of their average recipient. 
Google’s algorithm depends on more than 200 different factors.130  Google 
makes about 500 changes to it a year,131 based on ten times as many 
experiments.132  One sixth of the hundreds of millions of queries the algorithm 
handles daily are queries it has never seen before.133  The PageRank of any 
webpage depends, in part, on every other page on the Internet.134  And even 
with all the computational power Google can muster, a full PageRank 
recomputation takes weeks.135  PageRank is, as algorithms go, elegantly 
simple—but I certainly wouldn’t want to have the job of making Markov chains 
and eigenvectors “meaningful to the majority of Web users.”136  In practice, any 
simplified disclosure is likely to leave room for the search engine to bury plenty 
of bodies. 
Some scholars have suggested that concerns about transparency could be 
handled through regulatory opacity: The search engine discloses its algorithm to 
the government, which then keeps the details from the public.137  This is a 
promising way of dealing with search engines’ operational needs for secrecy, but 
it sharpens the question of regulators’ technical competence.  If the record is 
sealed, they won’t have third-party experts and interested amici to walk them 
through novel technical issues.  Everything will hinge on their own ability to 
evaluate the implications of small details in search algorithms.  The track record 
of agencies and courts in dealing with other digital technologies does not 
provide grounds for optimism on this score.138  Pasquale makes an important 
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point that “it is essential that someone has the power to ‘look under the hood,’”139 
but it is also important that algorithmic disclosure remain connected to a 
workable theory of what regulators are looking for and what they would do if 
they found it. 
Manipulation 
Perhaps the most interesting idea in the entire search neutrality debate is the 
“manipulation” of search results.  It’s a slippery term, and used inconsistently in 
the search-engine debates—including by me.140  In the dictionary sense of 
“process, organize, or operate on mentally or logically; to handle with mental or 
intellectual skill,”141 all search results are manipulated and the more skillfully the 
better.  But in the dictionary sense of “manage, control, or influence in a subtle, 
devious, or underhand manner,”142 it’s a bad thing indeed: no one likes to be 
manipulated.143 
In practice—although this is rarely made explicit—the concern is with what I 
have described elsewhere as “hand manipulation.”144  This idea imagines the 
search engine as having both an automatic, general-purpose ranking algorithm 
and a human-created list of exceptions.  Consumer Watchdog, for example, 
derides Google’s claim to rank results “automatically by algorithms,” saying, “It 
is hard to see how this can still be true, given the increasingly pronounced tilt 
toward its own services in Google’s search results.”145  Foundem calls it 
“manual intervention,” “special treatment,” and “manual bias,” and documents 
how Google’s public statements have quietly backed away from claims that its 
rankings are “objective” and “automatic.”146 
Put this way, the distinction between objective algorithm and subjective 
manipulation is incoherent.  Both kinds of decisions come from the same 
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source: the search engine’s programmers.147  Nor can the algorithm provide a 
stable baseline against which to measure manipulation, since each 
“manipulation” is a change to the algorithm itself.  It’s not like Bing has rooms 
full of employees looking over search results pages and making last-minute 
tweaks before the pages are delivered to users. 
Academics, being more careful with concepts, have focused on intentionality: 
does the search engine intend the promotions and demotions that will result 
from an algorithmic change?  Mark Patterson, for example, refers to 
“intentional manipulation of results.”148  Bracha and Pasquale sharpen this idea 
to speak of “highly specific or local manipulations,” such as singling out 
websites for special treatment.149  Chandler argues that “search engines should 
not manipulate individual search results except to address instances of suspected 
abuse.”150  Google itself is remarkably coy about whether and when it changes 
rankings on an individual basis.151 
Surprisingly, no one has explained why special-casing in and of itself is a 
problem.  One possibility is that it captures the distinction between individual 
adjudication and general rulemaking: changes that only affect a few websites 
trigger a kind of due process interest in individualized procedural protections.152  
There is also a kind of Rawlsian argument153 here, that algorithmic decisions 
should be made from behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing which websites 
they will favor.  For whatever reason, local manipulations make people nervous, 
nervous enough that most of the stories told to instill fear of search engines 
involve what is or looks like manipulation.154 
Local manipulation, however, is a distraction.  The real goal is relevance.  From 
that point of view, most local manipulations aren’t wrongful at all.  Foundem 
should know; it benefited from a local manipulation.  The penalty that afflicted 
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it for three years appears to have been a relatively general change to Google’s 
algorithm, one designed to affect a great many low-value vertical search sites.155  
When Foundem was promoted back to prominent search placement, that was 
actually the manipulation, since it affected Foundem and Foundem alone.  
Google thus “manipulated” its search results to exempt Foundem from what 
would otherwise have been a generally applicable rule.  To condemn 
manipulation on the basis of its specificity is to say that Google acted more 
rightfully when it demoted Foundem in 2006 than when it promoted it back in 
2009.156   
The point is that local manipulations, being quick and easy to implement, are 
often a useful part of a search engine’s toolkit for delivering relevance.   Search-
engine-optimization is an endless game of loopholing.  Regulators who attempt 
to prohibit unfair manipulations will have to wade quite far into the swamp of 
white-hat and black-hat SEO.157  Prohibiting local manipulation altogether 
would keep the search engine from closing loopholes quickly and punishing the 
loopholers—giving them a substantial leg up in the SEO wars.  Search results 
pages would fill up with spam, and users would be the real losers.  
Conclusion 
Search neutrality gets one thing very right:  Search is about user autonomy.  A 
good search engine is more exquisitely sensitive to a user’s interests than any 
other communications technology.158  Search helps her find whatever she wants, 
whatever she needs to live a self-directed life.  It turns passive media recipients 
into active seekers and participants.  If search did not exist, then for the sake of 
human freedom it would be necessary to invent it.  Search neutrality properly 
seeks to make sure that search is living up to its liberating potential. 
Having asked the right question—are structural forces thwarting search’s ability to 
promote user autonomy?—search neutrality advocates give answers concerned with 
protecting websites rather than users.  With disturbing frequency, though, 
websites are not users’ friends.  Sometimes they are, but often, the websites 
want visitors, and will be willing to do what it takes to grab them. 
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If Flowers by Irene sells a bouquet for $30 that Bob’s Flowers sells for $50, 
then Bob’s interest in being found is in direct conflict with users’ interest in 
being directed to Irene.  The last thing that Bob wants is for the search engine 
to maximize relevance.  Search-neutrality advocates fear that Bob will pay off 
the search engine to point users at his site.  But that’s not the only way the story 
can play out.  Bob could also engage in self-help SEO to try to boost his 
ranking.  In that case, the search engine may respond by demoting his site.  And 
if that happens, then Bob has another card to play: search-neutrality itself. 
Regulators bearing search neutrality can inadvertently prevent search engines 
from helping users find the websites they want.  The typical model assumed by 
search neutrality is of a website and a search engine corruptly conspiring to put 
one over on users.  But much, indeed most, of the time, the real alliance is 
between search engines and users, together trying to sort through the clamor of 
millions of websites’ sales pitches.  Giving websites search-neutrality rights gives 
them a powerful weapon in their wars with each other—one that need not be 
wielded with users’ interests in mind.159  Search neutrality will be born with one 
foot already in the grave of regulatory capture. 
There is a profound irony at the heart of the liberal case for search neutrality.  
Requiring search engines to behave “neutrally” will not produce the desired goal 
of neutral search results.  The web is a place where site owners compete fiercely, 
sometimes viciously, for viewers and users turn to intermediaries to defend 
them from the sometimes-abusive tactics of information providers.  Taking the 
search engine out of the equation leaves users vulnerable to precisely the sorts 
of manipulation search neutrality aims to protect them from.  Whether it ranks 
sites by popularity, by personalization, or even by the idiosyncratic whims of its 
operator, a search engine provides an alternative to the Hobbesian world of the 
unmediated Internet, in which the richest voices are the loudest, and the 
greatest authority on any subject is the spammer with the fastest server.  Search 
neutrality is cynical about the Internet—but perhaps not cynical enough. 
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